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It is hard to argue for vegetarianism. This may sound like a strange claim to make in a journal 
focussed on human-animal relations, but the reality is that most classic arguments ostensibly in 
favour of vegetarianism are actually arguments in favour of veganism (for example, Adams; 
Singer; Regan; cf. Milburn ‘Vegetarian Eating’). After all, the production of eggs and milk 
involves a great deal of objectification, death, and suffering for non-human animals (hereafter, 
animals), comparable to the levels of objectification, death, and suffering in meat production. 
This means that if our case for vegetarianism rests upon the objectification, death, or suffering of 
animals, it will be tricky to stop it from becoming an argument for veganism. 
There are the beginnings of arguments for vegetarianism (contra veganism) in animal 
ethics. Many are underdeveloped; for example, in conversations about in vitro meat and plant-
based ‘meats’, some theorists present arguments about the wrongfulness of eating meat (or 
meat-like products) that may or may not extend to non-meat products (for example, Cole and 
Morgan; Fischer and Ozturk; Miller). Rebekah Sinclair, working in Carol Adams’s feminist-
veg(etari)an critical theory, is actually explicit about not extending her arguments against ‘meat’ 
to non-meat animal products. She rejects all consumption of meat – even in vitro meat – while 
remaining (in principle) open to eating eggs and milk, which, she claims, ‘do not imply a 
necessary animal death’ (231-2). The arguments of Sinclair and others could thus – if issues in 
the production of animal foods are left aside for a second so that we may focus on issues in the 
consumption of animal foods – ground arguments for vegetarianism rather than veganism. 
However, no one (to my knowledge) builds these ideas into a fully-fledged argument for 
vegetarianism. When developed arguments for vegetarianism (and not veganism) are offered, on 
the other hand, they are unconvincing. Tzachi Zamir (‘Veganism’; Ethics and the Beast) is the one 
philosopher who offers a full argument for vegetarianism over veganism, which he bases on the 
image of a vegetarian utopia (in contrast to a vegan utopia) and a claim about effective 
campaigning on behalf of animals. His arguments fail on several grounds – or so I have argued 
elsewhere (Milburn ‘Vegetarian Eating’). 
Despite the paucity of developed, compelling philosophical defences of vegetarianism, 
the practice persists; as such, getting to the bottom of an argument in its favour would be a 
worthwhile activity for animal ethicists. Further, identifying particular wrongs in meat 
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consumption could be useful to animal ethicists for a variety of reasons – for example, in 
supplementing other arguments for ethical eating, to help with identifying genuinely 
unproblematic diets containing animal products (if any), or as a tool to encourage people to lead 
more compassionate lifestyles when other arguments have been unsuccessful. 
It is my contention that we can find a plausible case for vegetarianism – one that does 
not simply become a case for veganism – by drawing upon work in the recent ‘political turn’ in 
animal ethics, which is the emergence of animal-ethical work drawing upon the language and 
resources of political philosophy, rather than moral philosophy (see Garner and O’Sullivan; 
Milligan). In a line, the case is that eating meat involves the disrespect of an animal’s corpse; this 
is respect that animals are owed, crucially, because they are members of a particular mixed-
species political community. However, this argument says nothing about any wrong in the 
consumption of eggs, milk, honey, or other non-meat animal products. It is thus not an 
argument for veganism. Indeed, as it extends only so far as the relevant community membership 
extends, ultimately, the argument might not be for an entirely vegetarian diet – but that depends 
on precisely how we demarcate the ‘community’ in question. In this paper, I will set out the 
case, clarify its scope, and deal with two possible objections: first, that the argument is purely 
academic; second, that the argument does not go far enough. I will close by comparing it to 
Cora Diamond’s case for vegetarianism, from which it is distinct, but with which it shares 
several features. 
  
Against Eating Community Members 
The most significant text in the political turn in animal ethics is Sue Donaldson and Will 
Kymlicka’s Zoopolis. In this book, the authors argue that all sentient animals are entitled to 
certain basic rights in virtue of their sentience. They thus call for a declaration of animal rights 
comparable to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, they argue that all animals 
are entitled to rights beyond those in this declaration, but that the content of these further rights 
depends on the relationship the animals in question have with the (or perhaps, more precisely, a 
particular) mixed human/animal community. Animals who are a part of this community – 
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namely, domesticated animals, which includes not only companion animals but also farmed 
animals – are offered citizenship in this community. Animals who live separately from this 
community (that is, free-living or ‘wild’ animals) are offered sovereignty rights over their own 
community and space. Animals who do not quite fall into either category – so called liminal 
animals – are offered the rights of denizenship, comparable to the rights offered to human 
migrant workers. 
Zoopolis is a rich and inspiring work, offering a whole host of resources for exploring 
human-animal relationships. Crucial to the present enquiry, however, is a comment that 
Donaldson and Kymlicka make about the treatment of domesticated animals’ corpses. 
Questioning the idea that the zoopolis might permissibly use the corpses of domesticated  
animals to feed carnivorous animals,1 they write that some of the ideas people have about the 
treatment of corpses: 
are culturally (and religiously) variable, marking the boundaries of community. This 
could mean that while there are some ways in which we should never treat a corpse – 
human or animal, citizen or foreigner – there are special obligations we owe to 
members of the community… Perhaps, then, we ought to treat the bodies of 
domesticated animals the same way as human bodies in any given society or  
community, but the same obligation does not apply for corpses of those from  
outside the community. (151) 
Donaldson and Kymlicka do not present this as an argument about human consumption, 
but it has been drawn on by others exploring the ethics of human diet. Specifically, Bob Fischer 
and I (‘The Freegan Challenge to Veganism’) build on the thought to present a case against a 
range of freegan practices – freegans, as we use the term, are people who will eat animal 
products to stop them from going to waste, but are otherwise vegans. Fischer and I argue that if 
many animals can be considered members of mixed political communities, and are thus entitled 
to certain forms of respect that are extended to (human) community members qua community 
members, then certain norms around the treatment of corpses should be extended to them. 
Given that, in most communities, it is considered deeply disrespectful to eat the corpses of dead 
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human community members, the members of those same communities – on Donaldson and 
Kymlicka’s picture – should consider it deeply disrespectful to eat the corpses of dead non-
human community members. Thus, given that meat products are made from (parts of) 
domesticated animals’ corpses, we have a case against many common freegan practices, 
including dumpster-diving for canned beef soup and finishing ham sandwiches about to be 
binned after a meeting. Crucially, this is despite the fact that these freegan practices do not seem 
to contribute to any animal death or suffering. 
The case offered against (‘unrestricted’) freeganism can be generalised into an argument 
against the eating of (much) meat as follows. Let us call this the zoopolitical case for vegetarianism. 
1: The bodies of members of political communities must be treated in a way  
befitting that membership. 
2: Domesticated animals are members of particular mixed-species  
political communities. 
3: The bodies of domesticated animals must be treated in a way befitting animals’ 
membership in particular political communities. (From 1 and 2.) 
4: The consumption of the corpses of co-community-members is not considered 
treatment befitting the community member’s membership. 
5: The bodies of domesticated animals may not be consumed. (From 3 and 4.) 
6: Much commercially available meat is made from the bodies of domesticated animals. 
7: Much commercially available meat may not be consumed. (From 5 and 6.) 
Statements 1 and 2 offer contentious conceptual and normative claims drawing from the 
zoopolitics of Donaldson and Kymlicka. 3 follows unproblematically from their conjunction. 4 is 
a contingent empirical claim. There are communities (in theory and practice) in which the 
consumption of corpses is seen as wholly consistent with respecting the community-member 
whose corpse it is. For example, the Wari’ of the Amazon historically engaged in 
endocannibalism as part of a respectful funerary rite (Conklin). Today, the Aghori – an Indian 
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Saivite sect – apparently practice corpse-consumption, though the relationship of this practice to 
respect for corpses is far from simple (Barrett; Kaliff and Oestigaard). 
So, though it is not unheard of, communities engaging in cannibalism as a way to respect 
the corpses of co-community members (or at least as a practice consistent with respect for co-
community members) are few and far between. And corpse consumption as a funerary rite is 
very alien in the kinds of western, liberal-democratic states about which Donaldson and 
Kymlicka are writing – in these, the consumption of corpses is seen as abhorrent.2 And while an 
aversion to cannibalism may be able to explain some of this feeling, it cannot explain all of it. If 
it could, members of these western societies would presumably have little objection to feeding 
human corpses to carnivorous animals, but this proposal, too, is unlikely to gain much traction 
at present. (There are human communities in which corpses are fed to animals – including some 
Buddhist and Zoroastrian communities (Martin) – but these practices are deeply alien to much 
of the world.) 
Let us, then, take 4 for granted. Conjoined with 3, it gives us 5. One might object to 
this logical leap on the grounds that it fallaciously equates what is considered consistent with 
respectful corpse treatment with what is consistent with respectful corpse treatment. However, 
practices of corpse-treatment do not gain their legitimacy and importance from any kind of 
universal moral code, but from widespread acceptance within a given society – they are an issue 
of manners (cf. Buss). So the mere fact that the collective (in a given society) considers corpse 
consumption deeply disrespectful is enough for us to treat it as if it is disrespectful for the 
purposes of this argument. It could be that there are some universal rules of corpse-treatment, 
but presumably they will not include a proscription against treating (parts of) corpses as food – if 
they did, that would leave us committed to saying that there is something wrong with those 
societies in which human corpses are fed to animals or are eaten as part of a respectful funerary 
rite. That sounds suspiciously like a kind of cultural supremacism, and so (absent clear 
arguments to the contrary) should be rejected. 
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6 is a further empirical claim, though surely not a controversial one. When conjoined 
with 5, it gives us 7, our ultimate conclusion. Let us call the position advocated in 7 demi-
vegetarianism3 – and thus acknowledge that, strictly speaking, the zoopolitical case for 
vegetarianism is a case for demi-vegetarianism. 
Demi-vegetarianism is a long way from veganism. This argument offers us no reason to 
be concerned about the consumption of unfertilised eggs, dairy products, honey, or similar. It is 
also a step away from vegetarianism in that it still permits the consumption of meat sourced 
from animals who are not part of the community in question. For Donaldson and Kymlicka, this 
means non-domesticated animals, as the only animals afforded full membership in mixed 
human/animal communities are domesticated animals. (Later, I will touch on the possibility of a 
cosmozoopolis, in which wild animals are also considered community members.) Non-
domesticated animals, in Donaldson and Kymlicka’s eyes, live in communities without any 
norms of respectful corpse treatment, so there is little reason to think that we owe them such 
treatment.4 So, demi-vegetarianism will permit the consumption of much ‘seafood’, as well as 
much ‘game’ – though not the farmed versions of either. Wild-caught seafood or game, 
however, make up only a small portion of the meat available in supermarkets, and only a small 
(though admittedly highly variable) portion of the diets of most in the developed world, 
especially when we remember that ‘natural’ spaces are frequently artificially ‘stocked’ with 
animals, who might be fairly described as domesticated, for hunters and anglers. 
Demi-vegetarianism is thus permissive when compared to the diets endorsed in a great 
many contemporary cases for vegetarianism and veganism. Nonetheless, the argument is striking 
because, though it is animal-focused,5 it does not rely in any way on the wrongness of killing 
animals or inflicting suffering upon them. One could conceivably accept that there is no wrong 
in killing animals or inflicting pain upon them and yet still endorse demi-vegetarianism for the 
reasons outlined. This is why, I think, the case for demi-vegetarianism is worthy of note. 
Incidentally, we should not think that we could engage in some conceptual legerdemain 
to argue that demi-vegetarianism permits the consumption of meat from animals who were 
raised abroad, as these animals are not members of the community in question. Those who 
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endorse the zoopolitical case for vegetarianism would presumably still have a duty to respect the 
corpses of such animals, but there may be a slightly different story about what ‘respectful 
treatment’ entails than there would be for animals raised closer to home. After all, these 
‘foreign’ animals a part of a mixed community, and thus their corpses should be treated with 
respect – but what counts as respectful treatment may be a little different in their case. This is 
exactly analogous to the human case. Even if we accept that norms of corpse treatment are 
culturally variable, we would presumably not say that we have no obligation to respect the 
corpses of foreigners. Consistent with the different norms of respect in the foreigner’s society, 
however, we might think ourselves permitted to treat the corpse in a way we would never treat 
the corpses of our co-community members. Perhaps, then, members of a non-corpse-eating 
society may somehow come across the body of an animal from a corpse-eating society, and thus 
be permitted to eat it. However, it is surely not the case that any actual corpse-eating society – 
such as those mentioned above – considers anonymous packaging, mass-distribution, and sale of 
pieces of corpses part of a respectful funerary rite. It is thus hard to imagine a society retaining a 
trade in the meat of domesticated animals if the zoopolitical case for vegetarianism is accepted – 
short of a very radical cultural shift in understanding about what it means to respect corpses. 
 
Is This Argument Merely Academic? 
Readers might accept the usefulness of the zoopolitical case for vegetarianism as a supplement to 
standard cases for veganism – perhaps one that can help justify veganism over (certain forms of) 
freeganism (Milburn and Fischer). Alternatively, they might accept it as a part of a design of a 
vegetarian/vegan utopia (cf. Zamir, Ethics and the Beast; Milburn, ‘Vegetarian Eating’), which 
reveals that, even if meat could be acquired without harming any animals, we should not eat it. 
They might even acknowledge that a focus on the wrong of meat-eating rather than meat-
production could help overcome disassociations between the practice of meat-eating and the 
harms of animal agriculture. Such disassociation can be part of a strategy to avoid morally 
confronting one’s own meat-eating (cf. Rothgerber), or it can be a genuine philosophical 
concern about one’s own causal impotence (cf. Fischer). 
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Nonetheless, readers might question this argument’s utility as a freestanding case for 
demi-vegetarianism. Why, they might say, are people who do not care about the death and 
suffering of domesticated animals going to care about this ‘respect for corpses’ talk? There are 
two separate worries, here. The first is that people are unlikely care about respecting corpses 
without thinking that killing or otherwise harming is morally problematic. The second is that 
people are unlikely to believe that animals are community members if they are not already 
sympathetic towards veganism. Let us address these worries in turn. 
 First, consider the claim that we are unlikely to endorse norms of corpse-treatment 
without also saying that killing the being whose corpse this is, and/or making them suffer, is 
morally problematic. This should be rejected. In fact, there are a range of cases in which we are 
apparently prepared to endorse the claim that we must treat A’s body with respect even while 
rejecting the claim that killing/inflicting suffering upon A is impermissible. Take warfare. The 
law and ethics of war, basically by definition, do not condemn the killing of enemy combatants. 
Nonetheless, the importance of ‘respecting’ corpses, and preventing them from being 
‘despoiled’ or ‘mutilated’, is written into the Geneva Conventions, with a failure to respect 
corpses a war crime.6 Or take foetuses. While abortion – which involves the direct killing of a 
human foetus – is legal in many states, it need not follow that one may do whatever one wishes 
with the remains. The artist Rick Gibson famously had criminal charges brought against him for 
a sculpture featuring earrings made from freeze-dried foetuses (see Alghrani and Brazier). Or 
consider self-defence. Serious threats to oneself or others can justify visiting extreme violence 
on blameworthy individuals, or even (though this is more controversial) innocent third parties. 
It would be a perversion of ethical and legal systems permitting this, however, to use this fact to 
justify suspending norms of respectful corpse treatment – one may not cannibalise, sexually 
penetrate, or taxidermise the corpse of an attacker, even if one has legally and ethically killed 
said attacker in self-defence. 
There are, then, plenty of examples illustrating that it makes sense to talk of strong 
norms of corpse respect even for the corpses of those permissibly killed. We do not need to 
believe that anyone opposed to the unrestricted use of foetuses is ‘pro-life’, or that anyone 
opposed to the unrestricted use of criminals’ corpses is opposed to the death penalty, or that 
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anyone concerned about the treatment of dead in war is a pacifist. Equally, we have no reason to 
believe that only committed, animal-rights-endorsing vegans can affirm the importance of 
respecting domesticated animals’ corpses. 
Let us turn to the second strand of the objection. We might imagine that the importance 
of respecting the corpses of community members is relatively uncontroversial, but that the idea 
that domesticated (or any) animals are community members is a novel, fringe view. For the 
zoopolitical case for vegetarianism, I have drawn from the zoopolitics of Donaldson and 
Kymlicka. However, claims about humans and animals sharing community membership are not 
new. Mary Midgley, for example, conceptualises humans as living in a mixed human/animal 
community. Nor are such claims unique to those who could be labelled broadly animal-
protectionist. Kimberly Smith, for example, argues that it is a historical fact that domesticated 
animals are a part of our community. Nonetheless, she is far from a vegan. She is ‘inclined to 
choose the farmers over the animal rights advocates’ when it comes to the ethics of killing 
animals (64) – and the kind of ‘happy farming’ that Smith endorses is far from suffering-free 
(Stănescu). So her normative approach provides a concrete example of how the idea of animals 
as community members and the idea of animals as killable beings who can be made to suffer can 
sit together.7 The value of the case for demi-vegetarianism is that it shows how animals can be 
owed certain kinds of respect – including respectful treatment of their corpse – regardless of 
whether they are understood to have an interest in, or right concerning, not being killed. 
Thus, the zoopolitical case for vegetarianism is not merely academic. There are plenty 
of cases in which we accept the impermissibility of disrespectful corpse treatment without 
accepting the impermissibility of killing. Meanwhile, the status of animals as community 
members is not a mere quirk of Donaldson and Kymlicka’s zoopolitics; indeed, as  
demonstrated by the example of Smith, there are theorists who endorse the status of animals  
as members of communities while not endorsing the claim that it is impermissible to kill them  
or make them suffer. 
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It is worth noting that even were this not the case, and the zoopolitical case for 
veganism was merely academic, that would not make it valueless. Philosophical arguments do 
not solely seek to motivate; instead, they seek to appeal to reasons and values that – if being 
consistent – we (or someone else) should accept. 
 
Does This Argument Go Far Enough? 
Vegans will likely be unimpressed with the zoopolitical case for vegetarianism; they will insist 
that it does not go far enough. For example, vegans may worry that the argument fails to 
properly condemn the death and suffering involved in contemporary practices of egg and dairy 
farming, or of angling for free-living fish. I share the concern. Indeed, Donaldson and Kymlicka 
will share the concern, too; recall that they endorse universal basic animal rights, and so would 
likely be opposed to any practice that involves killing, or inflicting suffering upon, sentient 
animals. However, in a sense, the argument is not for vegans (unless as a supplement to other 
arguments) and they should welcome – in the interests of protecting animals and developing an 
overlapping consensus – new cases for (near-)vegetarianism. This is especially true when the 
arguments could serve to convince those who do not share certain key normative premises with 
animal protectionists – for example, the wrongness of inflicting death and suffering on animals, 
or else the normatively salient connection between these wrongs and one’s own consumption, 
given causal-impotence worries. 
If one wishes to stretch the zoopolitical case for vegetarianism to cover all cases of meat-
eating, then one will have to demonstrate that all animals belong to communities in which the 
consumption of corpses is disrespectful. One way to go would be to follow Donaldson and 
Kymlicka in identifying wild animals as members of separate communities to humans, but argue 
that these separate communities have norms of respectful corpse treatment. This, I suspect, will 
not be a successful strategy. It is unlikely that communities made up solely of animals have 
norms of corpse treatment. I allow that some more cognitively sophisticated animals may have  
 
 
A NOVEL ARGUMENT FOR VEGETARIANISM? 
251 
such norms, but this would be tricky to demonstrate; one would need to do more than prove 
that animals do not eat their dead to prove that they see eating their dead as disrespectful. And it is 
surely implausible that all or even many wild animals have such norms. 
A more promising approach would be to argue that Donaldson and Kymlicka are wrong 
to draw the boundaries of mixed human/animal communities as they do, and instead argue that 
all humans, domesticated animals, and wild animals share in a ‘community of fate’, and thus all 
are appropriately thought of as part of the same political community. This is the position of 
Alasdair Cochrane (‘Cosmozoopolis’; Sentientist Politics), who offers – in place of Donaldson and 
Kymlicka’s zoopolitics – a vision of cosmozoopolitics. If Cochrane is right about the political status 
of free-living animals, then perhaps the zoopolitical case for demi-vegetarianism can become a 
cosmozoopolitical case for vegetarianism. On this picture, all animals, domesticated or wild, 
would be entitled to respectful corpse treatment. However, specifying what constitutes 
respectful corpse treatment in the cosmozoopolis would be tricky – why should we accept that 
particular western human norms (i.e., not eating corpses) are the ones to be followed? 
Cochrane says nothing about the subject, and we should not attribute a cosmozoopolitical case 
for vegetarianism to him – in other work, he has explicitly defended the prospect of eating the 
corpses of domesticated animals who have died naturally (Animal Rights Without Liberation, 87-8). 
So, while challenging Donaldson and Kymlicka’s demarcation of the mixed-species community 
may provide a route to expanding the zoopolitical case for demi-vegetarianism, there are 
complications that must be addressed. 
Meanwhile, this argument is not useful for grounding the wrong of eating eggs, dairy, 
and the like, as these are not (made from) animal corpses. If one seeks theoretical resources for 
condemning these practices independently of concerns about the impropriety of inflicting harms 
on animals, one should look elsewhere. Identifying such theoretical resources would be a 
worthwhile exercise – but it is not the focus of the present paper. 
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Is This a Novel Case? 
Readers may question the novelty of the zoopolitical case for vegetarianism and argue that, as it 
focusses not on the suffering and death of animals but the way we should view them and their 
bodies, it shares an affinity with Cora Diamond’s case for vegetarianism. Like the zoopolitical 
case for vegetarianism, Diamond’s case against meat steps back from a focus on the intrinsic 
features or capacities of animals (for example, sentience), and asks about the kind of relationship 
we have with them. According to Diamond, animals share something crucial with humans – they 
are fellow creatures, and they can be our company. Is it appropriate for us to eat our ‘fellows’, our 
‘company’? Diamond thinks not. 
On the face of it, there is indeed a similarity, here. The zoopolitical case and Diamond’s 
case both take morally thick concepts (that is, concepts with both descriptive content and 
normative content) and include animals within the (at first glance, perhaps solely human) 
category so that they can apply the normative content of the concept to animals. In so doing, 
they do not lean too strongly on any particular foundational normative theory (though more on 
the philosophical foundations of the views in a second), such as utilitarianism or rights theory. 
This means that the arguments could have value and persuasive power for people who accept an 
array of different foundational normative theories. 
Clearly, though, the two arguments draw upon different thick concepts. Diamond’s 
notion of a fellow creature is drawn explicitly from literature, especially poetry. It is presented as 
a way for individuals to understand their personal relationships with other animals, and thus, 
derivatively, to help individuals relate appropriately to other animals. The concept of 
membership, however, is drawn from liberal political theory and practice. It is a term that can 
help us understand our societal relationship with other animals, and thus, derivatively, to help us 
relate appropriately to animals as both individuals and collectives. Not only are the concepts 
different, but the consequences of deploying them are different – as different sets of animals 
might be called ‘fellows’ and ‘members’. Most obviously, Diamond sees some wild animals as 
fellows, while Donaldson and Kymlicka do not see wild animals as co-members. 
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Nonetheless, this similarity does open up the possibility of extending other kinds of 
thick concepts to animals in search of arguments for vegetarianism. In fact, this work has already 
been done – or the first steps of it have already been made. Jeff Jordan, for example, extends 
the concept of friend to animals as a foundation for an argument for vegetarianism. As he tells us 
in the title of his paper, ‘friends shouldn’t let friends be eaten’. Recent work in animal studies 
has done important extension of other kinds of thick concepts to include animals – worker 
(Blattner, Coulter, and Kymlicka), for example, and refugee (Derham and Mathews). Whether 
or not these concepts could be useful for grounding arguments for vegetarianism or veganism 
remains to be seen, but the point is clear: in including animals within these thick concepts 
(member, fellow, company, friend, worker, refugee, citizen, denizen, sovereign, and so on), 
academics hope to ground better treatment for animals without having to rely on (for example) a 
full declaration of animal rights (see Eisen; Kymlicka). 
But while the zoopolitical case for vegetarianism, like Diamond’s case, is about 
including animals within key thick concepts, there are crucial metaphilosophical and metaethical 
differences between the zoopolitical case for vegetarianism and Diamond’s argument. Exploring 
the details of this will take us too far from the present enquiry, but Diamond draws explicitly 
upon the Wittgensteinian tradition in ethics (that is, ethics drawing from Ludwig  
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language), in sharp contrast to the more morally individualist 
approach of Donaldson and Kymlicka (for a useful introduction to this distinction in animal 
ethics, see Crary). Though Donaldson and Kymlicka are concerned with group membership in 
addition to the capacities of particular animals, their approach has more in common with the 
mainstream animal-ethical approaches of (say) Peter Singer and Tom Regan than it does with 
Diamond’s approach. 
In outlining the differences between the arguments, I do not mean to argue that one is 
inherently more compelling than the other. Both, perhaps, come with intellectual baggage that 
some are going to find unappealing – those drawn to more mainstream approaches to ethics 
might be put off by Diamond’s metatheoretical commitments, while those drawn to alternative 
political theories may be put off by the zoopolitical argument’s liberalism. For the right 
audience, either could be compelling. My point, instead, is simply that the arguments  
are different. 
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Concluding Remarks 
I have argued that if the corpses of members of our community are owed respectful treatment, 
and if domesticated animals are members of our community, then (assuming some plausible 
empirical assumptions) we should not be eating meat made from the corpses of domesticated 
animals. Crucially, I think the premises of this argument are true, and so I think that the 
conclusion is true, too. We should not be eating meat made from the bodies of domesticated 
animals; not (just) because of the harms involved in meat production, but because, in so doing, 
we fail to extend respect to the corpses of co-members of our community. What is more, 
however, I think these premises are relatively innocuous, and can realistically be adopted by 
people not already convinced of the moral necessity of veganism. This new argument for 
vegetarianism can thus be added to the growing list available to animal ethicists and animal 
activists. The argument, I suggest, will be of value in thinking through the ethics of eating animal 
products, supplementing and complementing more familiar approaches to the ethics of eating 
animals. For example, this argument could illustrate that there are problems in eating meat from 
the body of an animal even when doing so does not contribute to harm to that or other animals. 
The argument may also be of value in encouraging those unconvinced by classic cases for 
veg(etari)anism away from meat. From an animal-protectionist perspective, the zoopolitical 
argument for vegetarianism does not go far enough and cannot replace arguments for veganism 
based on the wrong of harming animals. However, tens of billions of terrestrial vertebrates are 
killed a year for food; if we start to include fish, decapod crustaceans, cephelapods, and others – 
as we surely must – the number enters the trillions. Those who see this as a problem should 
welcome tools that can help to overcome this harm. Perhaps those who do not see the wrong in 
killing animals or making them suffer but adopt vegetarianism nonetheless should be welcomed. 
For the cow, the theoretical commitments of the people not killing her do not matter; what 
matters is that they are not killing her.
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Notes 
1 For more on this kind of question, see Milburn, ‘The Animal Lovers’ Paradox’ and Milburn, 
‘Not Only Humans Eat Meat’. 
2 Incidentally, I am here neither endorsing nor condemning this abhorrence. The (ir)rational 
basis of claims about corpse treatment is orthogonal to my argument. That said, for a proposal 
for pushing societies towards a greater acceptance of the permissibility of eating (in vitro) human 
flesh, see Milburn, ‘Chewing Over In Vitro Meat’.  
3 Though acknowledging that it differs from other diets with a similar names, including R. M. 
Hare’s demi-vegetarianism (see Hare). 
4  Except insofar as there are universal norms of corpse treatment, though, again, it is surely not 
the case that there is a universal norm against the consumption of corpses. 
5  That is, it is not a case for veganism that focuses on the benefits of veganism for humans or the 
environment. It is about something owed directly to animals.  
6  For more details, see https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule113, which sets out rule 113 of Customary International 
Humanitarian Law: ‘Each party to the conflict must take all possible measures to prevent the 
dead from being despoiled. Mutilation of dead bodies is prohibited.’ 
7 One might claim that this argument is uncompelling, as these animals are part of our 
community only so that they might be killed. In response, I would contend that this is by-the-by. 
In the words of Robert Nozick, ‘the parallel argument about people would not look very 
convincing… An existing person has claims, even against those whose purpose in creating him 





A NOVEL ARGUMENT FOR VEGETARIANISM? 
256 
Works Cited 
Adams, Carol. The Sexual Politics of Meat. Continuum, 1990. 
Alghrani, Arnel, and Margaret Brazier. ‘What Is It? Whose It? Re-positioning the Fetus in the 
Context of Research.’ Cambridge Law Journal, vol. 70, no. 1, 2011, pp.51-82. 
Barrett, Ronald L. Aghor Medicine. University of California Press, 2008. 
Blattner, Charlotte, Kendra Coulter and Will Kymlicka, editors. Animal Labour. Oxford 
University Press, 2019. 
Buss, Sarah. ‘Appearing Respectful: The Moral Significance of Manners.’ Ethics, vol. 109, no. 4, 
1999, pp.795-826. 
Cochrane, Alasdair. Animal Rights Without Liberation. Columbia University Press, 2012. 
---. ‘Cosmozoopolis: The Case Against Group-differentiated Animal Rights.’ Law, Ethics and 
Philosophy, vol. 1, no. 1, 2013, 127-41. 
---. Sentientist Politics. Oxford University Press, 2018. 
Cole, Matthew, and Karen Morgan. ‘Engineering Freedom? A Critique of Biotechnological 
Routes to Animal Liberation.’ Configurations, vol. 21, no. 2, 2013, pp.201-29. 
Conklin, Beth A. Consuming Grief. University of Texas Press, 2001. 
Crary, Alice. ‘Ethics.’ Critical Terms for Animal Studies, edited by Lori Gruen, Chicago University 
Press, 2018, pp. 154-68. 
Derham, Tristan, and Freya Mathews. ‘Elephants as Refugees.’ People and Nature, vol. 2, no. 1, 
2020, pp.103-10. 




A NOVEL ARGUMENT FOR VEGETARIANISM? 
257 
Donaldson, Sue, and Will Kymlicka. Zoopolis. Oxford University Press, 2011. 
Eisen, Jessica. ‘Down on the Farm: Status, Exploitation and Agricultural Exceptionalism.’ 
Animal Labour, edited by Charlotte Blattner, Kendra Coulter, and Will Kymlicka, 
Oxford University Press, 2019, pp. 139-59. 
Fischer, Bob. The Ethics of Eating Animals. Routledge, 2019. 
Fischer, Bob, and Burkay Ozturk. ‘Facsimiles of Flesh.’ Journal of Applied Philosophy, vol. 34, no. 
4, 2017, pp. 489-97.  
Garner, Robert, and Siobhan O’Sullivan, editors. The Political Turn in Animal Ethics. Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2016. 
Hare, R. M. ‘Why I Am only a Demi-vegetarian.’ Peter Singer and His Critics, edited by Dale 
Jamieson, Wiley-Blackwell, 1999, pp. 233-46. 
Jordan, Jeff. ‘Why Friends Shouldn’t Let Friends Be Eaten.’ Social Theory and Practice, vol. 27, 
no. 2, 2001, pp. 309-22. 
Kaliff, Anders, and Terje Oestigaard. Cremation, Corpses and Cannibalism. Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 2017. 
Kymlicka, Will. ‘Social Membership: Animal Law Beyond the Property/Personhood Impasse.’ 
Dalhousie Law Journal, vol. 40, no. 1, 2017, pp.123-55. 
Martin, Dan. ‘On the Cultural Ecology of Sky Burial on the Himalayan Plateau.’ East and West, 
vol. 46, no. 3/4, 1996, pp. 353-370. 
Midgley, Mary. Animals and Why They Matter. University of Georgia Press, 1983. 
Milburn, Josh. ‘Not Only Humans Eat Meat: Companions, Sentience and Vegan Politics.’ 
Journal of Social Philosophy vol. 46, no. 4, 2015, pp. 449-62. 
 
 
A NOVEL ARGUMENT FOR VEGETARIANISM? 
258 
---. ‘Chewing Over In Vitro Meat: Animal Ethics, Cannibalism and Social Progress.’ Res Publica, 
vol. 22, no. 3, 2016, pp. 249-65. 
---. ‘The Animal Lovers’ Paradox? On the Ethics of “Pet Food”.’ Pets and People, edited by 
Christine Overall, Oxford University Press, 2017, pp. 187-202. 
---. ‘Vegetarian Eating.’ Handbook of Eating and Drinking, edited by Herbert L. Meiselman, 
Springer, 2019. 
Milburn, Josh, and Bob Fischer. ‘The Freegan Challenge to Veganism.’ Unpublished 
manuscript, 2020. 
Miller, John. ‘In Vitro Meat: Power, Authenticity and Vegetarianism.’ Journal for Critical Animal 
Studies, vol. 10, no. 4, 2012, pp. 41-63. 
Milligan, Tony. ‘The Political Turn in Animal Rights.’ Politics and Animals, vol. 1, 2015, pp. 6-
15. 
Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Basic Books, 1994. 
Regan, Tom. ‘The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism.’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 5, no. 2, 
1975, pp. 181-214. 
Rothgerber, Hank. ‘Real Men Don’t Eat (Vegetable) Quiche: Masculinity and the Justification 
of Meat Consumption.’ Psychology of Men & Masculinity, vol. 14, no. 4, 2013, pp. 363-
75. 
Singer, Peter. ‘Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism.’ Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 9, no. 4, 1980, 
pp. 325-37. 
Sinclair, Rebekah. ‘The Sexual Politics of Meatless Meat: (In)edible Others and the Myth of 
Flesh Without Sacrifice.’ The Future of Meat Without Animals, edited by Brianne 
Donaldson and Christopher Carter, Rowman & Littlefield, 2016, pp. 229-48. 
 
 
A NOVEL ARGUMENT FOR VEGETARIANISM? 
259 
Smith, Kimberly. Governing Animals. Oxford University Press, 2012. 
Stănescu, Vasile. ‘Beyond Happy Meat: The (Im)possibilities of “Humane”, “Local” and 
“Compassionate” Meat.’ The Future of Meat Without Animals, edited by Brianne Donaldson 
and Christopher Carter, Rowman & Littlefield, 2016, pp. 133-54. 
Zamir, Tzachi. ‘Veganism.’ Journal of Social Philosophy, vol. 35, no. 3, 2004, pp. 367-79. 
---. Ethics and the Beast. Princeton University Press, 2007.  
 
Acknowledgements 
I offer thanks to Bob Fischer for conversation and comments; to editors and reviewers at Animal 
Studies Journal for helpful suggestions; and to Alasdair Cochrane and the British Academy for 
supporting my research at Sheffield (grant number PF19\100101). 
 
